

# Don't GIG Up, Never!

## Country update – ITALY

*Matteo Luccisano / Sofia Gualandi  
Feliciano Iudicone / Tommaso Grossi  
(Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini)*

April 2022



[dontgigup.eu](http://dontgigup.eu)



# Don't GIG Up, Never!

## Country update – ITALY

*Matteo Luccisano / Sofia Gualandl / Feliciano Iudicone  
(Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini)*

April 2022



*The research for this report was supported by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs, and Inclusion, receiving funding under the call for proposals VP/2020/004 (Improving expertise in the field of industrial relations).*

*Disclaimer: Responsibility for the information, opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this report lies entirely with the author(s). The European Commission is not responsible for the use which might be made of the following information.*

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Public debate on platform work	2
Features and trends	7
Policy, legal and case law developments	10
Social partners' activities and grassroots campaigns	16
References	18

# INTRODUCTION

This report is part of a series of follow-up studies to the State of the Art report<sup>1</sup>, published in January 2019 under the project ‘Don’t GIG Up! Extending social protection to GIG workers in Europe’ (VS/2018/0018), and reviewing debate, studies, and policies arising on platform work in the following countries: France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain<sup>2</sup>.

As part of the ‘Don’t GIG Up, Never!’ project (VS/2021/0204), the report updates country level information up to February 2022, illustrating contextual information and recent developments around platform work. More in detail, the country update describes political, social and academic debate on platform work, results of recent research studies, relevant legislation and policy reforms, and social partners’ responses to the platform work. This was done using a questionnaire and instructions common to the different countries covered by the partnership.

To support the comparison of findings across countries, the report refers to the ‘Don’t GIG up!’ classification of labour platforms presented in Table 1.

**Table 1. Classification of labour platforms adopted in the project ‘Don’t GIG up!’**

Platforms involving passenger transport services (Uber, Lift...);	<b>Type 1</b>
Platforms involving goods delivery services (Deliveroo, Foodora...);	<b>Type 2</b>
Platforms involving ‘traditional gigs’, like gardening, cleaning activities (Task Rabbit, Helping...) up to skilled services (marketing, advertising, translating), possibly also by means of auctions (Fiverr, Upwork...);	<b>Type 3</b>
Platforms externalizing micro-tasks, often performed on web, to a ‘crowd’ of workers (crowd-work platform like Amazon Mechanical Turk).	<b>Type 4</b>

<sup>1</sup> The report is available under the following link: <http://www.dontgigup.eu/resources/>

<sup>2</sup> The web-site [www.dontgigup.eu](http://www.dontgigup.eu) hosts also two country reports addressing Sweden and Estonia respectively, and covering a larger time span for them were not included in the State of the Art report.

# PUBLIC DEBATE ON PLATFORM WORK

The political and media attention on the gig economy has been rising in Italy since 2015, following the entrance of big players like Uber in the transport market (Fontanarosa, Iudicone 2015; Eurofound 2016; Treu 2017; Faioli 2018; Magnani 2019; Faioli 2019). The outbreak of Covid-19 spiked the attention around labour platforms further, with disputes arising over the provision of personal protective equipment for food delivery workers, at a time their job was considered an 'essential' activity<sup>3</sup>.

As already outlined in the *Don't GIG Up! State of the Art Report*, since 2016, platform strikes have spread across Italy, involving workers from food delivery platforms like Glovo, Just Eat, Deliveroo and Foodora, protesting the decision of platforms to shift from hourly pay to piece-based pay (Mosca 2016), and demanding social insurance and income stability (Tassinari and Maccarrone 2017). Conflict continued in 2019 and during the pandemic, with food delivery workers asking for safer working conditions (Ciccarelli, 2020; Chari, 2020; Borghesi, 2021), and challenging the application of collective agreements deemed as non-representative and/or derogating minimum pay levels entailed in National Collective Bargaining Agreements. Other contentious areas include fighting 'digital' gang-mastering by subcontractors or 'senior' riders (Baratta, 2019), or asking platforms to tackle the use of apps by some workers themselves to 'hack' their ranking, and access more job opportunities than others (Bacchi, 2022).

Moreover, the debate was further shaped by the introduction of legal provisions addressing platform work in 2019, and by the judgement of the Italian Court of Cassation no. 1663 of 24 January 2020.

Law no. 128/2019 imposed several limitations to food-delivery platforms (see section 3 below). Among others, the law introduced a general presumption of hetero-organisation for platform workers, coupled with minimum protections

---

<sup>3</sup> In some cases, local authorities themselves provided gloves and masks, whilst the Tribunal of Florence and of Rome imposed by means of ordinances the provision of protective equipment by food delivery platforms

for self-employed delivery riders only. The conditions introduced for the latter clash with the platforms' business model, particularly with regard to the use of piecework and rating and ranking systems. The law imposed platforms to provide insurance to self-employed delivery riders against accidents at work with the public National Institute for Insurance Against Accidents at Work (INAIL), as well as the application of Legislative Decree no. 81/2008, i.e. the Italian Code on occupational safety and health. Based on these provisions, workers' representatives and unions requested some food delivery platforms to provide their workers with personal equipment to protect them from Covid-19 (masks, disinfected gels, disposable gloves, and alcohol-based solution for the disinfection of the backpack), obtaining favourable orders by the Tribunals of Firenze, Rome, and Bologna.

The Italian Court of Cassation, in its key decision 1663/2020, ruled in favour of food-delivery riders against Foodora. The intervention of the Supreme Court fits into a "protective" framework, where even if the 'subordination' is not established and the law still qualifies riders as self-employees, the entire set of protections granted to subordinate workers applies to them as well. The Supreme Court intentionally decided to not refer to Law no. 128/2019 quoted above.

Platforms offering low-skill, location-based job offers have taken hold significantly in recent years. Although many scholars researching labour platforms issues have focussed specifically on food delivery and passenger transport workers, platform work has been growing well beyond the food delivery sectors, also following the COVID-19 outbreak.

In Italy, other than the well known delivery and transport platforms, a few actors have gained momentum in specific sectors. A brief examination of some active platforms matching 'traditional gigs', skilled services (type 3 of the classification of labour platforms adopted in the 'Don't GIG Up!' project) and crowd-work platforms externalizing micro-tasks (type 4 of the classification) follows.

Platforms providing for care and domestic services include Helping, an intermediary platform matching customer with self-employed cleaners, as well as LeCicogne, which links babysitter and nannies to clients, following the same logic of 'matchmaking' (Faioli, 2018). After booking the service via the smartphone app, the platforms take a small fee for the service, then follows a rating enforced through the clients' feedback (Pais, 2019).

Platforms are going to become more and more a matter of concern for what we generally consider 'white collar' tasks too (Faioli, 2018 and 2021; Palier, 2019). Pushing a similar compensation, cognitive piecework is broken down into micro-tasks, as in the case of Amazon Mechanical Turk's Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs). While HITs available to Italy and Italian workers are fewer than for US residents, in Italy other platforms are offering the same services. Actors like Clickworker, Figure Eight, Microworkers, as well as platforms for responding to online surveys like Toluna and Greenpanthera offer low-skill digital tasks for little remuneration and following rating and feedback systems (Pais, 2019).

Amongst platforms for high-skill professions, a few actors are worthy of mention.

Often, highly qualified services can be delivered both online and in-person, as in the case of the French based SuperProf and the Italian based School teaching platforms, where graduates or teachers with no experience enrol to offer tutoring to Italian students and small groups while looking for a stable job (Pais and Gandini, 2020).

Likewise, platforms dedicated to traditional liberal professions have become increasingly common.

A literature review published by the European Parliament (Schmid-Drüner, 2016) reported about the Italian platform for architects CoContest. Research stressed that *“it makes only sense to participate in contests for designers in high income countries such as Italy if they have little experience and face high labour-market entry barriers, or if they value the flexibility more, as the average gross hourly pay of 5€ does not allow to reach the Italian average income of 1.477€/month in an average 8-hour working day”*. Indeed, since its launch in 2015 in Italy, CoContest (later renamed as GoPillar) has been subject of great controversy and it was accused by the National Board of Architects and the National Council of Professions (CNAPP) of unfair competition (Ferrigo, 2018).

On GoPillar, anyone can launch an online contest to furnish or renovate a house, an office or a store. Architects and designers participate in the contest by proposing their projects, and the best designs get paid. On average, it takes roughly 4 days of work, and the average prize is about € 700. For those who need to renovate their homes, GoPillar promises savings of 20% compared to a traditional architect. GoPillar therefore matches the demand for designers with the requests of potential clients: designers accept the challenge of convincing clients by presenting their own design idea while competing with other colleagues. However, the National Board of Architects and CNAPP challenged the platform, using Antitrust rules to open a proceeding and backing a parliamentary inquiry back in 2015<sup>4</sup>. Firstly, the Board contested the denigration of the profession: CoContest/GoPillar makes the ‘traditional system’ appear to be a slow, expensive process. In doing so, the platform relies on offering a non-specified service: on GoPillar you buy a design idea, and not an executive project, at the detriment of the client. Secondly, and most importantly, the platform does not guarantee paid work for designers, who therefore work for free for convincing potential clients. However, the Antitrust Authority did not initiate any proceedings, and the parliamentary inquiry did not go through. Lamenting unfair treatment, despite the absence of an actual legal procedure, the platform opted for a rebrand, changing its name to GoPillar and introducing some additional services for architects (Brambilla, 2017).

Psychologists are also targeted by third-party platforms matching their competency and experience with clients’ needs and necessities. On the top of a levy on services sold via the platform, Psychologyonline.net<sup>5</sup> creates the possibility to register for free with different monthly subscription plans entailing additional services (e.g., an online agenda and patients’ phonebook) and, most importantly, offering higher visibility for premium users, that means ultimately

---

4 Available in Italian at: <http://aic.camera.it/aic/scheda.html?numero=4%2F09150&ramo=CAME-RA&leg=17>.

5 See: [www.psicologionline.net](http://www.psicologionline.net).

distorting the functioning of the marketplace.

Indeed, the supply or sale of services to platform workers seems a common tool to raise revenues but also to attract workers.

For instance, Digital Work City, a platform addressing IT experts, designers, and marketing experts, makes training courses, legal counselling, or even private welfare services available for platform workers, yet mostly for sale. The platform, suggesting work opportunities on the basis of key words linked with workers' competences, funds itself via levies on the client and on the workers, the latter usually amounting to a 10% share on income<sup>6</sup>.

Doc Servizi, a cooperative of artists, musicians, and related technicians supplies services like fiscal and legal counselling, support to access public funding opportunities, safety of payments by clients via a dedicated office. These activities are funded via a 14% levy on incomes of platform workers, and the sale of some services themselves on a discounted price (Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini, 2020).

However, similar experiences seem to exploit economies of scale granted by the platform to provide attractive services for workers. The boundary between these activities and those of labour intermediation agencies are quite blurry, and risk breaching the relevant national legislation. Indeed, legislation on labour intermediation agencies entails, *inter alia*, accreditation by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies and a ban to supply services for payment to workers, except if agreed via collective agreement.

Finally, at the edge of platform work, 'influencers' are of note. In Italy, few scholars (Iervolino, 2021; Torsello, 2021) have put the emphasis on content creators and influencers, asking whether they should be recognised as workers and thus protected accordingly. Showing support or endorsement for certain brands, influencers generate income through advertising, taking part in economic interactions with said brands that chimes with that of other atypical workers. Alternatively, it is the platform itself that retributes influencers for placing advertisement in their videos. While the remuneration is calibrated on the basis of each one's visibility, no protection is foreseen for these economic relationships, which can be affected by delay, cancellation of the payment, unilateral change of terms of use by the platform, or abrupt freezing of accounts.

A professional association of 'influencers' (Assoinfluencer) was established in 2019. Among the aims enlisted in its statute, the association wishes: to defend influencers from excessive requirements and unfair restrictions issued by public institutions or by social networks, and to promote a social campaign for social networks to be recognised as a primary source of social aggregation and as a media on the same ground of press and TV, and for the recognition of online content creators as artists<sup>7</sup>. The professional association aims at defending them from unfair practices by platforms, and at ensuring better career prospects, also by lobbying for a recognition of this activity as a new economic

---

<sup>6</sup> See the website: <https://digitalworkcity.com>

<sup>7</sup> See: [www.assoinfluencer.org](http://www.assoinfluencer.org)



sector to be listed in the ATECO codes<sup>8</sup> (Il Mattino, 2021)<sup>9</sup>. Yet, there are no updates on activities or initiatives by this union so far.

---

<sup>8</sup> the Italian classification of economic activities which follows closely the NACE codes

<sup>9</sup> ATECO codes must be referred by self-employed when opening a VAT number and when registering at the National Institute of Social Security (INPS) to accrue social security contributions. In the absence of a specific code, currently they are unable to demonstrate which is their actual business, for instance when required a proof for accessing a mortgage, the union complains.

# FEATURES AND TRENDS

Italy lacks a public repository of labour platforms. Some lists can be however derived from certain activities or studies.

The mapping exercise of labour platforms initiated by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) in early 2017 (Fabo et al., 2017), found 200 active platforms in European countries (EU-28), of which 169 (84.5%) were founded in Europe and the remainder in other countries (most notably the United States). The mapping identifies only five platforms founded in Italy (Be My Eye, GoPillar - ItTaxi, Starbytes and SupperShare). Moreover, the field research implemented by Huws et al. (2019) provided a list of 14 platforms as possible answer options for workers based in Italy, including two established in Italy, such as SOSartigiani, a search engine to find artisan workers, and Semplifiko, a platform addressing care services and domestic chores currently active in Turin and Milan only. It is difficult to estimate the number of platforms active in Italy (Guarascio, 2018) – at least a quarter of the platforms present in Europe are also operational in the country.

Empirical evidence has revealed that the atypical nature of digital work is having a significant impact on the economy. While labour markets are going through a dramatic transformation, it is hard to assess the scope and scale of such a process. Conventional and traditional market statistics have been declared ill-suited to measuring “online gig work”, thus making employment and workers somewhat invisible to official data (Kässi and Lehdonvirta, 2018).

An unregulated and unquantifiable digital economy is likely to result in tax evasion and omission, subtracting revenue from tax authorities, creating unfair competition, blurring the boundaries of traditional employment (consumer/service provider; employee/self-employed etc.), and making the rights and obligations of those who participate and benefit from it equally uncertain (Faioli, 2021; De Minicis et al., 2021). In the attempt to shed a light over these issues, the last two editions of the Participation, Labour, Unemployment Survey (PLUS), developed by the National Institute for the Analysis of Public Policies (INAPP) has tried to capture the complexity of underlying economic interac-

tions (De Minicis et al. 2019; Bergamante et al., 2022). The main objective of the INAPP-PLUS survey is to provide statistically reliable estimates of phenomena that are rare or marginally explored by other surveys concerning the Italian labour market.

The findings from INAPP-PLUS<sup>10</sup> are in tune with the findings from previous surveys carried out by the De Benedetti Foundation and INPS, summarised in the Don't GIG Up! State of the Art report.

According to the most recent findings based on INAPP-PLUS, covering the 2020-2021 period<sup>11</sup>, there are more than 500,000 platform workers in Italy, or 1.3% of population aged 18-74 years. About half of the sample (48.1%) perform platform work as a main activity, 24.4% as a secondary job, whilst 27.5% consider themselves as 'inactive' or 'looking for a job', being labelled for the purposes of the study as 'occasional' platform workers. Almost 80% of platform workers are male, and the age distribution shows a peak in the 30-49 age group (about 70%). Younger workers are about 10% of the sample, yet their presence is particularly marked in the subgroup of 'occasional' platform workers, where they reach a 30% share.

The survey distinguishes between 'online-based platform work' and 'location-based platform work', suggesting a 65.1% share of location-based activities and a 34.9% share of platform workers working online (matching with type 4, and, partially, with type 3 of the classification). This share grows to 45.9% when 'occasional' platform workers only are considered.

The 65.1% share of location-based workers are divided between 4.7% in passenger transport (i.e., type 1), 50.2% in goods delivery activities (i.e., type 2), 9.2% care and domestic work (included, among other activities, in type 3), and other activities (1%).

About half of the sample (45%) work only for one platform, whilst a 47% share is involved in two platforms, whereas only 8% are active in three or more platforms. Indeed, 61% of platform workers declare to be subject to an evaluation system based on the number of completed tasks, a circumstance with clashes with the possibility to work for many platforms.

Only 11.5% of workers are classified as employees. Other statuses include quasi subordinate workers (19.9%), occasional self-employed (24.9%), self-employed with a VAT number (5.9%), and other self-employment contracts (6.6%). Finally, about one third of platform workers (31.1%) declare to perform work without any written contract. This share spans between 25.2% for workers in 'location-based' platforms to 42.1% for those in web-based platforms, often established outside Italy.

Workers without a contract are most often women, aged 18-29, and having a lower secondary school diploma only. This high rate may be partially explained by the lack of transparency or of knowledge on contractual conditions

---

<sup>10</sup> [INAPP\\_Lavoro\\_virtuale\\_mondo\\_reale\\_dati\\_indagine\\_inapp\\_plus\\_lavoratori\\_piattaforme\\_Italia\\_PB\\_25\\_2022.pdf \(lavorodirittieuropa.it\)](#)

<sup>11</sup> The survey was implemented by means of CATI and targeted a sample composed by more than 45,000 individuals aged 18-74 years, representative of the whole national territory. It can be

(a signed contract being not formally necessary for some relationships, like for occasional self-employment). Yet, researchers warn against a worrisome phenomenon of undeclared work or even of digital gang mastering, already emerging in lawsuits, and in the press<sup>12</sup>.

For what concerns remuneration, the sample is equally divided between workers paid per task and workers paid per hour. Yet only one third is paid directly by the platform, with a 53.2% share being paid by the client, and a 12.9% paid by an 'external entity', flagging again the possible role of subcontractors or of illicit intermediaries. Income from platform work is considered as essential or important by 80% of respondents, a share increasing from 49%, reported in the 2018 edition of INAPP-PLUS and possibly peaking due to the pandemic and the related restrictions.

The survey does not provide hints on satisfaction at work. Except for issues concerning remuneration and evaluation criteria, some attention is devoted to the reasons for undertaking platform work, with about 55% of respondents stating they could not find better alternatives, whilst one third stress the choice was linked with the aim to enjoy wider autonomy at work, and only 12.4% choose the work as an additional source of income.

---

<sup>12</sup> See the abovementioned: Baratta (2019), Borghesi (2021).

# POLICY, LEGAL AND CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS

Despite the technological change experienced across Europe, and the debate around the social and economic status of gig-workers, the concept of employment continues to be a cornerstone for initiatives and demands in the gig economy.

Coverage of platform workers by collective agreements has gone through a particularly difficult and lengthy process, yet to be completed. In June 2018, riders' representatives in Italy were contacted by the then Minister of Labour, who met them on the day of his appointment (Conte I government). The Government disclosed the intention to pass a law significantly extending the notion of employment meant to tackle abuse by platforms and, more in general, the phenomena of bogus self-employment. This met strong dissent from the platform companies which other political parties sided with, causing the bill to be stopped. A negotiation table was launched by the Minister of Labour for promoting a special social dialogue with, on one side, CGIL, CISL, UIL and further minor platform workers' unions and, on the other side, AssoDelivery (employers' organization connecting the main food delivery platforms<sup>13</sup>) along with Confcommercio, Confesercenti, Confetra, CNA and Confartigianato. Yet, the parties could not find an agreement, with the government eventually proceeding unilaterally by means of the Decree Law no. 101/2019, later converted with amendments into Law no. 128/2019.

## a. Legislative developments

Law no. 128/2019, amending legislative decree 81/2015 (Jobs Act), has established two different regimes for platform workers<sup>14</sup>. This was further clarified by the Circular no. 17 of 19 November 2020 of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies on employment protections for riders of digital platforms pursuant to

---

<sup>13</sup> Platforms belonging to Assodelivery are the following: see <https://assodelivery.it/chi-siamo/>

<sup>14</sup> For an analysis of the reform, see Perulli (2020).

Articles 2 and 47-bis et seq. of Legislative Decree No. 81/2015<sup>15</sup>

The first broader regime (new article 2, paragraph 1, Jobs Act) covers the so-called hetero-organised workers (i.e., workers whose activities are predominantly personal, continuous, and unilaterally “organised by the client”) “by means of platforms”. Under these conditions, platform workers shall remain “quasi-subordinate” whilst being applied protections of employment status. The second narrower regime (new Chapter-V bis, i.e., art. 47 ff., Jobs Act) lists a set of labour guarantees only for “self-employed riders delivering goods by means of two-wheels vehicles in urban areas”. For self-employed delivery riders only, the act entailed: (i) application of rules on occupational safety and health and statutory insurance against accidents at work; (ii) the prohibition for platforms to reduce working opportunities due to refusal of deliveries, (iii) a set of provisions on remuneration. Most importantly, a ban was introduced on piece rate pay, linking instead pay to hourly rates set by analogy with existing collective agreements as long as an ad-hoc agreement between social partners is not found.

Indeed, the reform has conferred bargaining power on trade unions, albeit in a convoluted manner, through Article 2(2)(a) of Decree 81/2015, now also to be referred to hetero-organised workers by platforms, and through the new Article 47c of Decree 81/2015 concerning self-employed delivery riders (Haipeter, Ludicone, 2020).

This way, Law no. 128/2019 backed efforts to pursue negotiations between platforms and unions, whilst introducing a first set of rights. However, due to the unclear legal text, many labour platforms refused to grant their workers the rights guaranteed by health and safety regulation to employees<sup>16</sup>. Legal doctrine has long discussed the shortcomings of this regulatory intervention for reaching the social aim to extend minimum standards and labour protections already foreseen for employees. Indeed, subsequent relevant case law developments in 2020-2021 are mainly based on legislative decree 81/2015 (Jobs Act). Otherwise, a couple of key court rulings quoted below (Palermo, November 2020 and Milan, April 2022) protected delivery riders by applying the notion of subordination of Article 2094 of the Civil Code.

## b. Case law developments

Another milestone was the abovementioned judgement of the Court of Cassation no. 1663 of 24 January 2020, the so-called Foodora case, that, providing for a peculiar interpretation of rules addressing quasi subordinate work, deemed food delivery riders entitled to protections granted to employees, applying a remedial perspective without reclassifying their formal status (see above, sez 1). The Court did so by applying article 2, paragraph 1, of the legislative decree 81/2015 (Jobs Act), extending the application of protective rules covering em-

<sup>15</sup> MINISTERO LAVORO E POLITICHE SOCIALI – Circolare 19 novembre 2020, n. 17 – Circolare in tema di tutele del lavoro del ciclo-fattorini delle piattaforme digitali ai sensi degli articoli 2 e 47-bis e seguenti, del decreto legislativo n. 81/2015 <https://www.lavoro.gov.it/notizie/pagine/riders-e-online-la-circolare-sulle-tutele-del-lavoro.aspx/>

<sup>16</sup> For a focused analysis of health and safety profiles of the reform, see Pascucci (2019).

ployment relationships to hetero-organised workers. The intervention of the Supreme Court fits into a “protective” framework, where even if the ‘subordination’ is not established and the relationship is still qualified as ‘self-employment’, subordinate worker status still applies to them.

While providing a strong guidance, especially for riders, different interpretations also arose in the light of the ongoing adjustments made by platforms to their internal algorithm-based work organisation, and to the circumstances of the case.

On 24 November 2020, for instance, the Tribunal of Palermo<sup>17</sup> reclassified a rider as an employee, arguing that he could not be fired or ‘logged off’ the platform. The Tribunal ruled in favour of the rider stressing that the nature of the activities carried out for Glovo was subordinate, recalling the so-called theory of ‘*doppia alienità*’, labelling the lack of ownership on results of work activities and of power in the organisation of activities (hetero organisation) as key criteria to ascertain the subordination of work. An even more recent decision of the Court of Milan in April 2022 goes in the same direction, establishing the subordinate nature of the employment relationship of a Deliveroo Italia rider<sup>18</sup>

Again, in the framework of appeals for personal protective equipment, it is important to note that Labour Courts in Florence, Bologna and Rome<sup>19</sup>, recognising the application of the protections of subordinate employment under legislative decree 81/2008 on health and safety at work, have re-qualified the employment relationships of delivery riders as hetero-organised workers under the new Article 2 of legislative decree 81/2015 (Jobs Act).

Other important judgements, going beyond the classification of goods delivery workers, addressed cases of discrimination, anti-union behaviour, gang mastering, and data processing.

The Court of Bologna (Order 31 December 2020) upheld the appeal filed by CGIL-affiliated local unions condemning the company Deliveroo Italia for discriminatory conduct, with consequent compensation for damages in favour of the plaintiffs. In its ruling, the judge ascertained the discriminatory nature Deliveroo’s algorithm “Frank” used to schedule riders’ work sessions. According to the judge, Frank was discriminatory in that it penalised riders who were absent from work in order to exercise their right to strike as well as for other reasons deemed ‘worthy of protection’ (Fassina, 2021).

Similarly, in 2021, another ruling of the Tribunal of Milan<sup>20</sup> represents a very important step forward in the recognition of union rights in favour of workers employed in the gig economy. Following the request by unions affiliated to CGIL and UIL, the Court has recognized for the first time the unions’ right to act for the repression of conduct detrimental to the role and function of the union by

---

17 Judgement of the Tribunal of Palermo, Labour Section, no. 3570 of 20 November 2020.

18 [Rider vince la causa con la Uiltucs contro Deliveroo: è lavoro subordinato - UILTuCS](#)

19 Cfr.: Trib. Firenze, decr., 1.04.2020, n. 866; ord. 5 maggio 2020; ord., 22 luglio 2020; ord. 31 luglio 2020. Nonché: Trib. Bologna decr. 14 aprile 2020, n. 745; ord. 1 luglio 2020; ord., 8 agosto 2020 e Trib. Roma ord., 31 marzo 2020.

20 Judgement of the Tribunal of Milan, Labour Section, no. 8609 of 25 March 2021.

companies operating on the platform. Even in the dematerialised world of the digital economy, trade union rights must be recognized and effectively protected. This is what has been affirmed in the context of the dispute, initiated against Everli, a platform of so-called shoppers who do the shopping on behalf of the company's customers (De Marchis Gomez, 2021).

Moreover, following the work undertaken by the Public Prosecutor of Milan, the Tribunal of Milan unveiled the articulation and the intricate system of subcontracting ultimately leading to work exploitation and gang mastering (*caporalato*) in Uber Eats, at the detriment of migrants or other economically and socially vulnerable individuals. The proceeding's files include testimonies of a system of fear, made of threats, pay and fees deductions, illegal tax arrangements (Inversi, 2021). The judgement disclosed in October 2021 sanctioned intermediary companies only, contracted out food delivery activities by Uber Eats. As far as Uber Eats is concerned, the Tribunal made the company subject to a judicial supervision in May 2020 and lifted restrictions only in March 2021 following improvements in working conditions.

### c. Other public bodies' measures

The National Privacy Authority has intervened in the domain of platform work. Following a joint inquiry with the Spanish authority, in June 2021, the Glovo controlled Foodinho company was sanctioned with a 2.6 million Euro fine for treating personal data in breach of Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR) and ordered to identify measures capable of avoiding discrimination of workers following feedback by clients<sup>21</sup>. Among other points, the authority contested the lack of transparency on the functioning of algorithms, risks of errors in the treatment of data for the purpose of rating systems, the absence of appropriate procedure to challenge their results.

Finally, by means of Decree Law no. 152/2021, the government introduced a specific administrative declaration for "work activities intermediated by platforms". The declaration, effective from 14 April 2022, is meant to provide public institutions (including labour inspectorates) a clear picture of relationships taking place via platforms, as it covers also occasional self-employed contracts not addressed by the system of preventive communications targeting beginning, variation, and termination of work relationships (so-called "Comunicazioni Obbligatorie"). However, the communication about these contracts can be submitted with a delay of almost two months<sup>22</sup>, and it is not clear yet how platform companies subject to the new obligation will be identified in practice. At the same time, the scope of the preventive declaration targeting occasional self-employment contracts, introduced at the end of 2021 by Decree Law no. 146/2021 art.13.1 and targeting all enterprises, was suddenly restricted via a by-law excluding contracts concerning 'intellectual' tasks like translations, editing of texts or graphic design<sup>23</sup>.

---

21 The text of the order is available at: <https://www.garanteprivacy.it/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/9675440>.

22 More specifically, within 20th of the month following the beginning of the relationship.

23 See the answer to the question no. 5 in the Joint Communication of the Ministry of Labour



## d. Pre-existing Italian provisions tackling outsourcing practices impacting on labour platforms

Several provisions can be listed to tackle abuse of non-standard contracts or outsourcing, whenever the actual characteristics of the work performance do not match with its formal characteristics.

First, whenever self-employed workers ('occasional' or not) are subject to the power of 'direction' in their work performance and of 'sanctions' by the client (i.e., resembling features of subordinate work, art. 2094 of the Civil Code), they can obtain the reclassification to employee by Courts<sup>24</sup>, or the labour inspectors can issue sanctions and injunctions for the actual employer to do so. It is worthy to recall this reclassification does not apply in case of economic dependency. Whereas economic dependency may be deemed as one of the supplementary criteria used by courts whenever the actual direction and sanction powers by the client are difficult to ascertain, there are not sanctions nor protections applying for the economically dependent self-employed as such. A legal attempt meant to reclassify economically dependent workers as employees was introduced by Law no. 92/2012 and abrogated in 2015 by legislative decree 81/2015 (Jobs Act).

The same act reshaped provisions addressing quasi subordinate employment. In the light of later adjustments, and of the relevant guidance by the Supreme Court illustrated above (judgement no. 1663 of 24 January 2020), the following rules apply. A genuine quasi subordinate relationship (for so-called hetero-organised workers) shall comply with the following three criteria: (i) being mainly 'personal' (i.e. to be performed mainly by the person accepting the obligation); (ii) being 'continuative' (i.e. entailing the fulfilment of one or more tasks or the delivery of results over time); (iii) being 'coordinated' by the client (i.e. the client has the power to assure the fulfilment of the contract according to commonly agreed modalities)<sup>25</sup>.

Where case work is hetero-organised by the client, i.e., the coordination is not mutually agreed but the client organises unilaterally the work performance, workers shall remain quasi subordinate whilst being applied protections of employment status. Several exceptions apply, most notably in the case where social partners have agreed an ad-hoc contractual scheme or for where regulated professions having an intellectual nature.

Quasi subordinate contracts can also be requalified as subordinate contracts whenever the above-mentioned criteria for subordination are found (i.e., the client performs decision and sanction powers).

---

and National Labour Inspectorate of 27 January 2022, available at: <https://www.ispettorato.gov.it/it-it/orientamentiispettivi/Documents/Nota-ML-INL-prot-109-27012022-comunicazione-lavoratori-occasionali-ulteriori-chiarimenti.pdf>.

24 In the light of the changing features of work, some case law resembles a more functional approach, addressing aspects concerning work organisation, such as the absence of ownership on results and of power or organisation by the worker (so-called 'doppia alienità') (Perulli, 2015).

25 Whilst it is undoubtful that the organisation power entails a deeper involvement of the client than the mere 'coordination' power, the actual boundary between the two remains contentious as illustrated by the Foodora case itself.

As for subcontracting, this is considered legitimate as long as the subcontractor organises the means of production and bears the business risk. Otherwise, the case may be considered 'illicit intermediation of manpower', and workers can claim a reclassification as employees of the contractor (art. 29 of Legislative Decree no. 276/2003). According to the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, subcontractors shall 'implement' works, whilst the 'supply' of workers is a task of licensed temporary employment agencies<sup>26</sup>.

Subcontracting is illegitimate also if 'implemented for the sole purpose of circumventing mandatory provisions established by law or collective agreement', as possibly proved by labour inspectors or by courts, for instance in case it is implemented only in a view to apply a less expensive collective agreement or to circumvent limits to temporary employment (art. 38 bis of Legislative Decree no. 81/2015)<sup>27</sup>.

Regardless of whether the contract is genuine or not, subcontractors' workers benefit of joint liability clauses between the contractor and the subcontractor for any outstanding remuneration and unpaid social security contribution. Anyhow, the enactment of such clauses may be hard to sustain for platform workers, especially as the amounts contested to a specific client may be risible compared with the efforts required to initiate and prosecute a lawsuit.

---

<sup>26</sup> As the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies states on the basis of legislation and case law in its Communication no. 5 of 11 February 2011.

<sup>27</sup> See, in this respect, the Communication by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies no. 3 of 11 February 2019.

# SOCIAL PARTNERS' ACTIVITIES AND GRASSROOT CAMPAIGNS

## a. Collective agreements' developments

In November 2020, the employers' organisation AssoDelivery achieved an agreement with the non-representative trade union 'UGL Rider', whose representativeness in the sector was immediately questioned by other unions<sup>28</sup> and by the Ministry itself<sup>29</sup>. The agreement was defined as "pirate" and contested before the Tribunal of Bologna, successfully leveraging protections against 'anti-union' behaviour and demanding Deliveroo to stop applying the AssoDelivery-UGL agreement<sup>30</sup>.

The second and more relevant collective agreement is the Protocol signed on 2<sup>nd</sup> November 2020 by the employers' associations and Filt-CGIL, Fit-CISL and Uil-Trasporti. This Protocol constitutes the response of the traditional Italian trade unions to the previous Assodelivery-UGL agreement and guarantees broader protections in favour of self-employed riders pursuant to Article 47-bis of legislative decree 81/2015, including, especially, the extension of the discipline on remuneration established with the 2018 collective agreement on Logistics and Transport signed by the same social partners. So far, among the largest platforms, in 2021 Just Eat signed a firm level agreement to gradually insource food delivery workers as employees, albeit with some temporary downward adjustments on pay and maintaining very flexible conditions in terms of working time.

---

28 While leveraging on the same piece of law, social partners in the logistics sector signed an agreement extending to self-employed food delivery workers the protections of employees.

29 Communication of the Ministry of Labour and Social policies no. 7 of 30 October 2020, and Communication no.17 of 19 November 2020.

30 Tribunal of Bologna, Labour Section, decree of 30/06/2021 <https://www.wikilabour.it/segnalazioni/sindacale/tribunale-di-bologna-30-giugno-2021/>

## b. Other initiatives

The main initiatives led by grassroots movements and unions over the latest years addressed working conditions in goods delivery platforms.

In July 2019, CGIL launched the 'No easy riders' campaign, meeting with food delivery workers, and leafleting flyers in different languages with a set of political demands across several Italian cities. As highlighted in the previous paragraphs, the union also prompted lawsuits, leveraging on union prerogatives in the field of anti-discrimination law or anti-union behaviours.

Ahead of the outburst of the pandemic in Italy, and the difficulties to obtain adequate health, safety and social protection, in March 2020, grassroots movements of riders launched a protest campaign in large Italian cities<sup>31</sup>, including video testimonies and photos using common hashtags. Workers obtained some improvements by platforms (e.g., Deliveroo granted sick pay in case of Covid-19 infection or quarantine in Turin and Milan), whilst some initiatives by local authorities were also reported (Tassinari et al., 2020)<sup>32</sup>.

In May 2020, these grassroots movements, self-defined as 'informal unions' representing the first and largest modalities of aggregation among food delivery workers, joined their forces with CGIL, CISL and UIL, which have been increasing their presence among riders over time. The newly created 'Riders for rights' network soon became a tool to jointly oppose the application of the collective agreement signed by Assodelivery and UGL, to keep the attention on riders high by policy makers, and to strengthen links between groups of food delivery workers in large and in small cities (Cini et al. 2021; Tassinari et al., 2020).

On 25 February 2021, the network held an online assembly reaching 32 cities and launched a national strike, claiming for adequate pay and working conditions (Cini and Chesta, 2021; Avelli 2021).

Despite the conflictual climate, on 24 March 2021<sup>33</sup>, Assodelivery signed with CGIL, CISL, UIL, in the presence of the Ministry of Labour, an experimental protocol to tackle gang mastering in the sector. The protocol entails cooperation activities between signatory parties to identify cases at risk and platforms' commitment to implement a set of actions to monitor subcontracting of foods delivery activities, including the creation of a list of trusted subcontractors, and the avoidance of subcontracting by the time the list is ready.

---

31 Deliverance Milano and Deliverance Project (Turin), Riders Union Bologna, Riders Union Roma, and Riders for Naples – Pirate Union.

32 In Bologna, food delivery workers obtained the supply of 500 masks by the Municipality (Tassinari et al., 2020). Among other local initiatives, in May 2020, the Lazio Region introduced a € 200 bonus paid to food delivery workers for the purchase of protective masks. See: <https://www.regione.lazio.it/rl/nessuno-escluso/>.

33 Servizi-Food delivery: [Protocollo quadro sperimentale per la legalità contro il caporalato, l'intermediazione illecita e lo sfruttamento lavorativo nel settore del food delivery](#). 24.03.2021.

# REFERENCES

Avelli, A. J. (2021), *Diritti per i riders*. Lavoro, Diritti, Europa, no. 1/2021, available at: <https://www.lavorodirittieuropa.it/dottrina/lavori-atipici/598-diritti-per-i-riders>

Bacchi, U. (2022), *The delivery apps making gig work a 'digital wild west'*, Thomson Reuters Foundation, 02/02/2022, available at: <https://news.trust.org/item/20220131145930-ge3kl/>

Ballestrero, M.V. (2021), *Ancora sui "rider". La cecità discriminatoria della piattaforma - Still on the "riders". The discriminatory platform blindness*, in *Labor*, 2021 fasc. 1, pp. 104-114

Baratta, L. (2019), *Caporalato digitale, i rider denunciano: "Le aziende sapevano da tempo. E gli stava bene"*, 21 September 2019, Linkiesta, available at: <https://www.linkiesta.it/2019/09/rider-caporalato-digitale/>

Bergamante, F., Della Ratta, F., De Minicis, M., and Mandrone, E. (eds.) (2022), *Lavoro virtuale nel mondo reale: i dati dell'indagine INAPP-PLUS sui lavoratori delle piattaforme in Italia*, INAPP Policy Brief, no. 25 [https://oa.inapp.org/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.12916/3406/INAPP\\_Lavoro\\_virtuale\\_mondo\\_reale\\_dati\\_indagine\\_inapp\\_plus\\_lavoratori\\_piattaforme\\_Italia\\_PB\\_25\\_2022.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](https://oa.inapp.org/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.12916/3406/INAPP_Lavoro_virtuale_mondo_reale_dati_indagine_inapp_plus_lavoratori_piattaforme_Italia_PB_25_2022.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)

Borghesi, A. (2021), *Food delivery: la via del sindacato tra contrattazione e vertenzialità*, Lavoro, Diritti, Europa, no. 3/2021, available at: <https://www.lavorodirittieuropa.it/dottrina/lavori-atipici/814-food-delivery-la-via-del-sindacato-tra-contrattazione-e-vertenzialita>

Brambilla, M. (2017), *Che fine ha fatto CoContest?*, Architetti.com, 7/09/2017, available at: <https://www.architetti.com/cocontest-gopillar.html>

Carinci, F. (2021), *Il percorso giurisprudenziale sui "rider". Da Tribunale Torino 7 maggio 2018 a Tribunale Palermo 24 novembre 2020 - The jurisprudential path about the riders from "Tribunale" Torino 7 May 2018 to "Tribunale" Palermo 24 November 2020*, ADL Argomenti di diritto del lavoro, 2021 fasc. 1, pp. 1 - 25

Carinci, M.T. (2021), *I lavoratori delle piattaforme quali 'working poors'*, *Labor*, 2021 fasc. 6, pp. 627- 636

Chiari, R. (2020), *Il rider Yiftalem primo Rls italiano: "Noi rischiamo ogni giorno, senza tutele né diritti"*, Il Manifesto, 29/09/2020, available at: <https://ilmanifesto.it/il-rider-yiftalem-primo-rls-italiano-noi-rischiamo-ogni-giorno-senza-tutele-e-diritti/>

Ciccarelli, R. (2020), *All'esercito dei rider arrivano le mascherine ma non i diritti*, Il Manifesto, 15/04/2020, available at: <https://ilmanifesto.it/allesercito-dei-rider-arrivano-le-mascherine-ma-non-i-diritti/>

Cini, L., Chesta, R. E. (2021), *I riders in sciopero e il caporalato digitale*, Collettiva.it, available at: <https://sbilanciamoci.info/i-lavoratori-del-food-delivery-tra-nuovi-conflitti-e-inchieste-per-caporalato-digitale/>

Cini, L., Maccarrone, V., Tassinari, A. (2021), *With or without U(nions)? Understanding the diversity of gig workers' organizing practices in Italy and the UK*, European Journal of Industrial Relations, available at: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/09596801211052531>.

De Angelis, L. (2021), *Su forma e prova del lavoro dei 'riders', anche nella pandemia*, Labor, 2021 fasc. 1, pp. 59-65

De Marchis Gomez, G. (2021), *Gig economy, arrivano i diritti sindacali*, Collettiva, available at: [https://www.collettiva.it/copertine/lavoro/2021/04/07/news/gig\\_economy\\_entrano\\_i\\_diritti\\_sindacali-989226/](https://www.collettiva.it/copertine/lavoro/2021/04/07/news/gig_economy_entrano_i_diritti_sindacali-989226/)

De Minicis, M., Dona, S., Lettieri, N., and Marocco, M. (2019), *Disciplina e tutela del lavoro nelle digital labour platform. Un modello di tecno-regolazione*, INAPP Working paper no. 6, available at: <https://oa.inapp.org/xmlui/handle/20.500.12916/371>

De Minicis, M., Mandrone, E., Marocco, M. (2021), *World Wide Work – Il lavoro nella rete*, Forum Disuguaglianze Diversità, 28/05/2021, available at: <https://www.forumdisuguaglianzediversita.org/world-wide-work-il-lavoro-nella-rete/>

Fabo, B., Beblavý, M., Kilhoffer, Z., Lenaerts, K. (2017), *An overview of European Platforms: Scope and Business Models*, JRC Science Hub, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union.

Faioli, M. (2019), *Il lavoro nella gig-economy*, in: Treu, T., Libro dell'anno del diritto 2019, Treccani Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, Rome, pp. 304-310

Faioli, M. (2021), *Unità produttiva digitale. Perché riformare lo Statuto dei lavoratori*, *Economia & Lavoro*, no. 1/2021, pp. 41-53

Faioli, M. (ed.) (2018), *Il lavoro nella gig-economy*, I Quaderni del CNEL, available at: [https://www.cnel.it/Portals/0/CNEL/Pubblicazioni/quaderni/Quaderni\\_Cnel\\_3\\_GigEconomy\\_Faioli.pdf?ver=2018-12-11-111816-207](https://www.cnel.it/Portals/0/CNEL/Pubblicazioni/quaderni/Quaderni_Cnel_3_GigEconomy_Faioli.pdf?ver=2018-12-11-111816-207)

Fassina, L. (2021), *L'algoritmo Franck, cieco ma non troppo*, Lavoro, Diritti, Europa, available at: <https://www.lavorodirittieuropa.it/dottrina/lavori-atipici/626-l-algoritmo-franck-cieco-ma-non-troppo>

Ferrigo, N. (2018), *Arriva l'app degli architetti per progettare la casa. L'Ordine: "Concorrenza sleale"*, La Stampa, 2/10/2018, available at: <https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/economia-finanza/2018/10/02/news/arriva-l-app-degli-architetti-per-progettare-la-casa-l-ordine-concorrenza-sleale-1.34049616/amp/>

Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini (2020), *Case Study Italy – Doc Servizi*, available at: <https://seedingproject.eu/2020/10/20/docservizi/>

Fontanarosa, F., Iudicone, F. (2015), *Italy: Taxi drivers protest against private car service*, Eurofound, available at: <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sr/publications/article/2015/italy-taxi-drivers-protest-against-private-car-service>

Guarascio, D. (ed.) (2018), *Report sull'economia delle piattaforme in Europa e in Italia*, INAPP REPORT no. 7, INAPP

Haipeter, T., Iudicone, F. (2020), *New social initiatives on cloud and gigwork - Germany and Italy compared*, Hungarian Labour Law E-Journal, 202/2, pp. 17-40, [http://hlj.hu/letolt/2020\\_2\\_a/03\\_ThHaipeter\\_FIudicione\\_hlj\\_uj\\_2020\\_2.pdf](http://hlj.hu/letolt/2020_2_a/03_ThHaipeter_FIudicione_hlj_uj_2020_2.pdf)

Huws, U., Spencer, N.H., Coates, M., and Holt, K. (2019), *The Platformisation Of Work In Europe: Results from research in 13 European countries*, FEPS - Foundation for European Progressive Studies, UNI Europa, Hertfordshire Business School, University of Hertfordshire

Iervolino, P. (2021), *Sulla qualificazione del rapporto di lavoro degli influencers*, Labour & Law Issues, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 26-51, available at: <https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.2421-2695/13986>

Il Mattino (2021), *Influencer, nasce il primo sindacato italiano: «Altro che ricchi, siamo iper-precari e in balia delle piattaforme»*, 30/09/2021, available at: [https://www.ilmattino.it/economia/news/influencer\\_sindacato\\_italiano\\_news\\_ul-time\\_notizie-6226736.html](https://www.ilmattino.it/economia/news/influencer_sindacato_italiano_news_ul-time_notizie-6226736.html)

Il Sole 24 Ore (2020), *Ecco la startup che innova l'organizzazione del lavoro*, 01/10/2020, available at: <https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/ecco-startup-che-innova-l-organizzazione-lavoro-ADzkNBu>

Inversi, C. (2021), *Caporalato digitale: il caso Uber Italy Srl*, Lavoro e diritto, no. 2/2021, pp. 335-346

Kässi, O., Lehdonvirta, V. (2018) *Online labour index: Measuring the online gig economy for policy and research*, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 137, pp. 241-248

Magnani, M. (2019), *Nuove Tecnologie e diritti sindacali*, Labour & Law Issues, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 1-8

Magnani, M. (2020), *Subordinazione, eterorganizzazione e autonomia tra ambiguità normative e operazioni creative della dottrina*, Diritto delle relazioni industriali, 2020 fasc. 1, pp. 105-115

Martelloni, F. (2021), *Un giudice disarmi i "cavalieri della pandemia": niente condotta antisindacale per le piattaforme di "food-delivery"?*, Rivista italiana di diritto del lavoro, 2021 fasc. 1, pp. 136 - 142

Mosca, G. (2016), *Lo sciopero contro Foodora è il sogno infranto della sharing economy*, Wired, 11/10/2016 [https://www.wired.it/economia/lavoro/2016/10/11/sciopero-contro-foodora-sogno-infranto-sharing-economy/?refresh\\_ce](https://www.wired.it/economia/lavoro/2016/10/11/sciopero-contro-foodora-sogno-infranto-sharing-economy/?refresh_ce).

Pais, I. (2019) *La platform economy: aspetti metodologici e prospettive di ricerca*, Polis no. 1, XXXIII, pp. 143-160

Pais, I., Gandini, A. (2020). *Reputation and Personal Branding in the Platform Economy*, in: Taylor, S., Luckman, S. (eds), *Pathways into Creative Working Lives*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, pp. 231-248, available at: [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38246-9\\_13](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38246-9_13).

Pascucci, P. (2019). Note sul futuro del lavoro salubre e sicuro... e sulle norme sulla sicurezza di rider & co.", in *Diritto della Sicurezza sul Lavoro*, No. 1 (2019) <https://doi.org/10.14276/2531-4289.2142>

Perulli, A. (2015), *Il lavoro autonomo, le collaborazioni coordinate e le prestazioni organizzate dal committente*, WP CSDLE "Massimo D'Antona", no. 272/2015, available at: [http://csdle.lex.unict.it/Archive/WP/WP%20CSDLE%20M%20DANTONA/WP%20CSDLE%20M%20DANTONA-IT/20151015-010522\\_perulli\\_n272-2015itpdf.pdf](http://csdle.lex.unict.it/Archive/WP/WP%20CSDLE%20M%20DANTONA/WP%20CSDLE%20M%20DANTONA-IT/20151015-010522_perulli_n272-2015itpdf.pdf).

Perulli, A. (2020), *Il diritto del lavoro "oltre la subordinazione": le collaborazioni etero-organizzate e le tutele minime per i riders autonomi* (CSDLE working paper, No. 410). Catania, University of Catania – Centre for the Study of European Labour Law "Massimo D'Antona".

Perulli, A. (2021), *Il "rider" di Glovo: tra subordinazione, etero-organizzazione, e libertà - Glovo's rider: between subordination, hetero-organization, and freedom*, ADL Argomenti di diritto del lavoro, 2021 fasc. 1, pp. 37-70

Razzolini, O. (2021), *'Riders', condotta antisindacale e ruolo del sindacato: il processo come strumento di rilancio dell'azione sindacale nella 'gig economy'*, in *giustiziacivile.com*, 2021 vol. 8 fasc. 9, pp. 1-20

Recchia, G.A. (2021), *L'accordo integrativo aziendale "just eat takeaway": quando la "gig economy" (ri)trova la subordinazione e il sindacato*, *Rivista giuridica del lavoro e della previdenza sociale*, 2021 fasc. 3, pp. 449-463

Santoro Passarelli, G. (2021), *Il nuovo volto del diritto del lavoro a cinquanta anni dallo Statuto dei Lavoratori*, *Rivista di diritto civile*, 2021 fasc. 1, pp. 1-49

Schmid-Drüner, M. (2016), *The situation of workers in the collaborative economy*, In-depth-analysis, European Parliament, available at [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/587316/IPOL\\_IDA\(2016\)587316\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/587316/IPOL_IDA(2016)587316_EN.pdf)

Tassinari A., Chesta R. E., Cini L. (2020), *Labour conflicts over health and safety in the Italian Covid19 crisis*, *Interface: a journal for and about social movements*, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 128 – 138.

Tassinari, A., Maccarrone, V. (2017), *The mobilisation of gig economy couriers in Italy: some lessons for the trade union movement*, *Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research*, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 353-357

Torsello, L. (2021), *Il lavoro degli influencers: percorsi di tutela*, *Labour & Law Issues*, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 152- 171, available at: <https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.2421-2695/13982>.



Treu, T. (2017), *Rimedi, tutele e fattispecie: riflessioni a partire dai lavori della Gig economy*, Lavoro e Diritto, no. 3-4, pp. 367-406.



**DON'T GIG UP**

**NEVER!**